[Paper] Ret2dir: Rethinking Kernel Isolation

[CVE] libexif 缓冲区溢出 CVE-2009-3895漏洞分析

😀



### CVE-2019-13288漏洞分析

---



#### 简述

在 Xpdf 4.01.01 中 Parser.cc 中的 Parser::getObj() 函数可能会通过精心设计的文件导致无限递归 远程攻击者可以利用它进行 DoS 攻击



#### 环境配置

> Xpdf版本选用3.02

下载对应版本Xpdf并解压 

```bash
$ wget https://dl.xpdfreader.com/old/xpdf-3.02.tar.gz
$ tar -xvzf xpdf-3.02.tar.gz
```

![](https://blogdownload.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/20230612170352.png)



创建临时文件夹

```bash
$ mkdir ~/install/
```



编译Xpdf

```bash
$ ./configure --prefix="$HOME/install/"
$ make
$ make install
```

![](https://blogdownload.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/20230613110419.png)



下载测试样例

```bash
$ mkdir example & cd example
$ wget https://github.com/mozilla/pdf.js-sample-files/raw/master/helloworld.pdf
$ wget http://www.africau.edu/images/default/sample.pdf
$ wget https://www.melbpc.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/small-example-pdf-file.pdf
```

![](https://blogdownload.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/20230612171747.png)



AFL基础依赖配置

```bash
$ sudo apt-get install -y build-essential python3-dev automake git flex bison libglib2.0-dev libpixman-1-dev python3-setuptools
$ sudo apt-get install -y lld-11 llvm-11 llvm-11-dev clang-11 || sudo apt-get install -y lld llvm llvm-dev clang 
$ sudo apt-get install -y gcc-$(gcc --version|head -n1|sed 's/.* //'|sed 's/\..*//')-plugin-dev libstdc++-$(gcc --version|head -n1|sed 's/.* //'|sed 's/\..*//')-dev
```



编译AFL++

```bash
$ git clone https://github.com/AFLplusplus/AFLplusplus & cd ./AFLplusplus
$ export LLVM_CONFIG="llvm-config-11"
$ make
$ sudo make install
```

![](https://blogdownload.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/20230612173321.png)



使用`afl-clang-fast`重新编译Xpdf

```bash
$ cp -r ./AFLplusplus ~/
$ cd ./xpdf-3.02
$ make clean
$ export LLVM_CONFIG="llvm-config-11"
$ CC=$HOME/AFLplusplus/afl-clang-fast CXX=$HOME/AFLplusplus/afl-clang-fast++ ./configure --prefix="$HOME/install/"
$ make
$ make install
```



#### 漏洞分析



使用AFL对`pdftotext`进行FUZZ

```bash
$ afl-fuzz -i ./example/ -o ./out/ -s 123 -- ./install/bin/pdftotext @@ ./output/
```



玩了会手机 发现有25个crash

![](https://blogdownload.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/20230612175934.png)



随便找一个crash样例测试一下 可以看到确实导致`pdftotext`段错误从而崩溃

```bash
$ ./install/bin/pdftotext ./out/default/crashes/id:000001,sig:11,src:000982,time:631621,execs:241760,op:havoc,rep:16
```

![](https://blogdownload.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/20230612181756.png)



使用GDB载入测试

![](https://blogdownload.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/20230612182202.png)

![](https://blogdownload.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/20230612182227.png)



既然漏洞文档说了是无限递归问题 那么就使用`bt`指令查看下栈帧 发现确实是无限递归调用 那么现在问题就是无线递归的起始点在哪

![](https://blogdownload.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/20230612185047.png)



通过翻看栈帧调用其实也能基本确定 很明显`#58137 - #58131`是一个循环节 即`dictLookup() -> fetch() -> getObj() -> getObj() -> getObj() -> getObj() -> makeStream()`

![](https://blogdownload.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/20230612185153.png)



其次 通过分析最初始的栈帧调用 很明显第一次调用是没有问题的 关键就是在于`makeStream() -> dictLookup()`这一步

![](https://blogdownload.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/20230612185419.png)



可以从源码级来审视一下调用 在`pdftotext.cc:151`新建了一个`PDFDoc`对象  且此时的参数`fileName`类型为`GString`

```c
// xpdf/pdftotext.cc
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
  ...
  // open PDF file
  if (ownerPassword[0] != '\001') {
    ownerPW = new GString(ownerPassword);
  } else {
    ownerPW = NULL;
  }
  if (userPassword[0] != '\001') {
    userPW = new GString(userPassword);
  } else {
    userPW = NULL;
  }
  doc = new PDFDoc(fileName, ownerPW, userPW);
  ...
}
```

![](https://blogdownload.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/20230612200813.png)



根据参数类型选择对应的`PDFDoc` 整体逻辑很简单就是打开文件 然后创建文件流 最后调用`PDFDoc::setup()` 因为我们在最初始的时候没有传入密码相关的参数 所以此时的`ownerPassword`和`userPassword`按道理来说仍然指向`0x0`

```c++
// xpdf/PDFDoc.cc
PDFDoc::PDFDoc(GString *fileNameA, GString *ownerPassword,
	       GString *userPassword, void *guiDataA) {
  Object obj;
  GString *fileName1, *fileName2;

  ok = gFalse;
  errCode = errNone;

  guiData = guiDataA;

  file = NULL;
  str = NULL;
  xref = NULL;
  catalog = NULL;

  fileName = fileNameA;
  fileName1 = fileName;


  // try to open file
  fileName2 = NULL;
  if (!(file = fopen(fileName1->getCString(), "rb"))) {
    fileName2 = fileName->copy();
    fileName2->lowerCase();
    if (!(file = fopen(fileName2->getCString(), "rb"))) {
      fileName2->upperCase();
      if (!(file = fopen(fileName2->getCString(), "rb"))) {
	error(-1, "Couldn't open file '%s'", fileName->getCString());
	delete fileName2;
	errCode = errOpenFile;
	return;
      }
    }
    delete fileName2;
  }

  // create stream
  obj.initNull();
  str = new FileStream(file, 0, gFalse, 0, &obj);

  ok = setup(ownerPassword, userPassword);
}
```

![](https://blogdownload.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/20230612201757.png)



这里根据函数名可以大致推测出来相关功能 首先是检查了文件头 判断传入的是不是PDF文件 然后检查PDF文件的Xref表 检查文件是否损坏 然后检查加密情况 最后根据Xref交叉引用表 新建Catalog对象生成Catalog文档目录

```c++
// xpdf/PDFDoc.cc
GBool PDFDoc::setup(GString *ownerPassword, GString *userPassword) {
  str->reset();

  // check header
  checkHeader();

  // read xref table
  xref = new XRef(str);
  if (!xref->isOk()) {
    error(-1, "Couldn't read xref table");
    errCode = xref->getErrorCode();
    return gFalse;
  }

  // check for encryption
  if (!checkEncryption(ownerPassword, userPassword)) {
    errCode = errEncrypted;
    return gFalse;
  }

  // read catalog
  catalog = new Catalog(xref);
  if (!catalog->isOk()) {
    error(-1, "Couldn't read page catalog");
    errCode = errBadCatalog;
    return gFalse;
  }
	...
}
```

![](https://blogdownload.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/20230612203517.png)



追入对象 发现上来就调用了`getCatalog` 未发现对`catDict`的赋值通过动态调试出`catDict`

```c++
// xpdf/Catalog.cc
Catalog::Catalog(XRef *xrefA) {
  Object catDict, pagesDict, pagesDictRef;
  Object obj, obj2;
  char *alreadyRead;
  int numPages0;
  int i;

  ok = gTrue;
  xref = xrefA;
  pages = NULL;
  pageRefs = NULL;
  numPages = pagesSize = 0;
  baseURI = NULL;

  xref->getCatalog(&catDict);
```

![](https://blogdownload.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/20230612204756.png)



注意这里调用的是`Object`类型的`fetch`

```c++
 // xpdf/XRef.h
 Object *getCatalog(Object *obj) { return fetch(rootNum, rootGen, obj); }
```



`Object.fetch`只是简单对`xref.fetch`进行封装 通过动调我们可以发现此时传入的参数为`xref->fetch(5, 0, &catDict)` 其中`&catDict == 0x7fffffffdbd0`

```c++
Object *Object::fetch(XRef *xref, Object *obj) {
  return (type == objRef && xref) ?
         xref->fetch(ref.num, ref.gen, obj) : copy(obj);
}
```

![](https://blogdownload.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/20230613111040.png)

![](https://blogdownload.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/20230613110903.png)



根据动态调试程序会流向`XRef.cc:823` 也就是`parser->getObj` 此时调用的参数为`parser->getObj(&catDict, NULL, <RC4>, 21845, 5, 0)`

```c++
// xpdf/XRef.cc
Object *XRef::fetch(int num, int gen, Object *obj) {
  XRefEntry *e;
  Parser *parser;
  Object obj1, obj2, obj3;

  // check for bogus ref - this can happen in corrupted PDF files
  if (num < 0 || num >= size) {
    goto err;
  }

  e = &entries[num];
  switch (e->type) {

  case xrefEntryUncompressed:
    if (e->gen != gen) {
      goto err;
    }
   	...
    parser->getObj(obj, encrypted ? fileKey : (Guchar *)NULL,
		   encAlgorithm, keyLength, num, gen); // here
		...
}
```



根据栈帧显示 就是在此处的`makeStream`造成了无限递归 此时其参数为`makeStream(&cataDict, NULL, <RC4>, 21845, 5, 0)` 跟`getObj`的参数保持一致 注意此处的`Dict`对象是新建的

```c++
// xpdf/Parser.cc
Object *Parser::getObj(Object *obj, Guchar *fileKey,
		       CryptAlgorithm encAlgorithm, int keyLength,
		       int objNum, int objGen) {
  char *key;
  Stream *str;
  Object obj2;
  int num;
  DecryptStream *decrypt;
  GString *s, *s2;
  int c;

  ...
   obj->initDict(xref); // 此处新建Dict对象
    while (!buf1.isCmd(">>") && !buf1.isEOF()) {
      if (!buf1.isName()) {
	error(getPos(), "Dictionary key must be a name object");
	shift();
      } else {
	key = copyString(buf1.getName());
	shift();
	if (buf1.isEOF() || buf1.isError()) {
	  gfree(key);
	  break;
	}
	obj->dictAdd(key, getObj(&obj2, fileKey, encAlgorithm, keyLength,
				 objNum, objGen)); // Dict新增键值对
      }
    }
    if (buf1.isEOF())
      error(getPos(), "End of file inside dictionary");
    // stream objects are not allowed inside content streams or
    // object streams
    if (allowStreams && buf2.isCmd("stream")) {
      if ((str = makeStream(obj, fileKey, encAlgorithm, keyLength,
			    objNum, objGen))) {
	...
```



此处调用`dictLookup` 并且调用`dictLookup`时的参数`obj`是新建的`Object`对象 所以与参数`dict`无关

```c++
// xpdf/Parser.cc
Stream *Parser::makeStream(Object *dict, Guchar *fileKey,
			   CryptAlgorithm encAlgorithm, int keyLength,
			   int objNum, int objGen) {
  Object obj;
  BaseStream *baseStr;
  Stream *str;
  Guint pos, endPos, length;

  // get stream start position
  lexer->skipToNextLine();
  pos = lexer->getPos();

  // get length
  dict->dictLookup("Length", &obj);
  if (obj.isInt()) {
    length = (Guint)obj.getInt();
    obj.free();
  } else {
    error(getPos(), "Bad 'Length' attribute in stream");
    obj.free();
    return NULL;
  }
  ...
```



功能也比较明显 从`Object对象的dict属性中调用lookup方法` 其实就是从对象`Object`中寻找对应`key`的值

```c++
inline Object *Object::dictLookup(char *key, Object *obj)
  { return dict->lookup(key, obj); }
```

```c++
class Object {
public:

  // Default constructor.
  Object():
    type(objNone) {}

  // Initialize an object.
  Object *initBool(GBool boolnA)
    { initObj(objBool); booln = boolnA; return this; }
  Object *initInt(int intgA)
    { initObj(objInt); intg = intgA; return this; }
  Object *initReal(double realA)
    { initObj(objReal); real = realA; return this; }
  Object *initString(GString *stringA)
    { initObj(objString); string = stringA; return this; }
  Object *initName(char *nameA)
    { initObj(objName); name = copyString(nameA); return this; }
  Object *initNull()
    { initObj(objNull); return this; }
  Object *initArray(XRef *xref);
  Object *initDict(XRef *xref);
  Object *initDict(Dict *dictA);
  Object *initStream(Stream *streamA);
  Object *initRef(int numA, int genA)
    { initObj(objRef); ref.num = numA; ref.gen = genA; return this; }
  Object *initCmd(char *cmdA)
    { initObj(objCmd); cmd = copyString(cmdA); return this; }
  Object *initError()
    { initObj(objError); return this; }
  Object *initEOF()
    { initObj(objEOF); return this; }

  // Copy an object.
  Object *copy(Object *obj);

  // If object is a Ref, fetch and return the referenced object.
  // Otherwise, return a copy of the object.
  Object *fetch(XRef *xref, Object *obj);

  // Free object contents.
  void free();

  // Type checking.
  ObjType getType() { return type; }
  GBool isBool() { return type == objBool; }
  GBool isInt() { return type == objInt; }
  GBool isReal() { return type == objReal; }
  GBool isNum() { return type == objInt || type == objReal; }
  GBool isString() { return type == objString; }
  GBool isName() { return type == objName; }
  GBool isNull() { return type == objNull; }
  GBool isArray() { return type == objArray; }
  GBool isDict() { return type == objDict; }
  GBool isStream() { return type == objStream; }
  GBool isRef() { return type == objRef; }
  GBool isCmd() { return type == objCmd; }
  GBool isError() { return type == objError; }
  GBool isEOF() { return type == objEOF; }
  GBool isNone() { return type == objNone; }

  // Special type checking.
  GBool isName(char *nameA)
    { return type == objName && !strcmp(name, nameA); }
  GBool isDict(char *dictType);
  GBool isStream(char *dictType);
  GBool isCmd(char *cmdA)
    { return type == objCmd && !strcmp(cmd, cmdA); }

  // Accessors.  NB: these assume object is of correct type.
  GBool getBool() { return booln; }
  int getInt() { return intg; }
  double getReal() { return real; }
  double getNum() { return type == objInt ? (double)intg : real; }
  GString *getString() { return string; }
  char *getName() { return name; }
  Array *getArray() { return array; }
  Dict *getDict() { return dict; }
  Stream *getStream() { return stream; }
  Ref getRef() { return ref; }
  int getRefNum() { return ref.num; }
  int getRefGen() { return ref.gen; }
  char *getCmd() { return cmd; }

  // Array accessors.
  int arrayGetLength();
  void arrayAdd(Object *elem);
  Object *arrayGet(int i, Object *obj);
  Object *arrayGetNF(int i, Object *obj);

  // Dict accessors.
  int dictGetLength();
  void dictAdd(char *key, Object *val);
  GBool dictIs(char *dictType);
  Object *dictLookup(char *key, Object *obj);
  Object *dictLookupNF(char *key, Object *obj);
  char *dictGetKey(int i);
  Object *dictGetVal(int i, Object *obj);
  Object *dictGetValNF(int i, Object *obj);

  // Stream accessors.
  GBool streamIs(char *dictType);
  void streamReset();
  void streamClose();
  int streamGetChar();
  int streamLookChar();
  char *streamGetLine(char *buf, int size);
  Guint streamGetPos();
  void streamSetPos(Guint pos, int dir = 0);
  Dict *streamGetDict();

  // Output.
  char *getTypeName();
  void print(FILE *f = stdout);

  // Memory testing.
  static void memCheck(FILE *f);

private:

  ObjType type;			// object type
  union {			// value for each type:
    GBool booln;		//   boolean
    int intg;			//   integer
    double real;		//   real
    GString *string;		//   string
    char *name;			//   name
    Array *array;		//   array
    Dict *dict;			//   dictionary
    Stream *stream;		//   stream
    Ref ref;			//   indirect reference
    char *cmd;			//   command
  };

};
```



可以看到跟预测的功能差不多

```c++
Object *Dict::lookup(char *key, Object *obj) {
  DictEntry *e;

  return (e = find(key)) ? e->val.fetch(xref, obj) : obj->initNull();
}
```



这里比较关键的就是 动态跟进`find` 发现`e->val`类型为`objRef`

![](https://blogdownload.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/20230613115300.png)



其中由于上面看到的`e->val->type == objRef` 所以满足条件 执行`xref->fetch(5, 0, newobj)` 至此陷入无限递归

```c++
Object *Object::fetch(XRef *xref, Object *obj) {
  return (type == objRef && xref) ?
         xref->fetch(ref.num, ref.gen, obj) : copy(obj);
}
```



整体修复思路也比较简单 要么限制递归次数 要么对寻找出来的`e`的类型进行校验即可

[CVE] Xpdf CVE-2019-13288 漏洞分析

[CVE] cgroup CVE-2021-4154漏洞分析

[Paper] DirtyCred: Escalating Privilege in Linux Kernel

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